MARCK FORMATTED

1/31/2011 5:31 PM

NECESSARY ROUGHNESS?: AN ARGUMENT
FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY IN CASES OF STUDENT-ATHLETE
SUSTAINED HEAT-RELATED DEATHS
David Marck
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 177  
I.POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY SYSTEM·S
DETERRENT EFFECT ........................................................ 179  
A.   Proving Prima Facie Negligence ............................. 180  
B.   Defenses to Negligence Claims ............................... 183  
1.   Express Assumption of the Risk......................... 183  
2.   Implied Assumption of the Risk ......................... 185  
3.   Qualified Immunity ............................................ 187  
4.   Sovereign Immunity and Damage Caps ............ 190  
II.UTILIZATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO
REDUCE HEAT-RELATED DEATHS.................................... 193  
A.   Model Penal Code Section 210.4 ³ Negligent
Homicide .................................................................. 195  
B.   Model Penal Code Section 230.4 ³ Endangering
the Welfare of Children ........................................... 198  
C.   Model Penal Code Section 211.2 ³ Recklessly
Endangering Another Person .................................. 200  
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 201  
INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 2008, fifteen year old Max Gilpin, a
sophomore at Pleasure Ridge Park High School in Louisville,
Kentucky, died as a result of heat stroke, sepsis and multiple
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RUJDQ IDLOXUH DW .RVDLU &KLOGUHQ·V +RVSLWDO1 Three days
earlier, Max collapsed during what prosecutors later termed a
´EDUEDULFµ SUDFWLFH FRQGXFWHG LQ QLQHW\-four degree heat by
his high-school football coach, Jason Stinson.2 When taken to
the emergency URRP 0D[·V ERG\ WHPSHUDWXUH UHSRUWHGO\
registered 107 degrees.3 On January 22, 2009,4 in a nation-
wide first,5 Jefferson County Prosecutors charged Stinson
with reckless homicide6 UHVXOWLQJ IURP *LOSLQ·V GHDWK
6WLQVRQ·V WULDO FRPPHQFHG RQ $XJXVW  09, and the jury
returned its verdict on September 17, 2009.7 After only
ninety minutes of deliberations, the jury found Stinson not
guilty.8
The Gilpin-Stinson case brought national media attention
to a subject that typically garners only local headlines. This
may be changing, however, as student-athlete sustained heat-
related deaths have increased in the last decade, 9 leading to
1. Brett Barrouquere, $FTXLWWHG .\ &RDFK 1R :LQQHUV LQ 3OD\HU·V 'HDWK,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/
2009919530_apusplayerdeathcoach.html;; Jason Riley, Stinson Found Not Guilty in
353 3OD\HU·V 'HDWK, COURIER J. (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.courier-journal.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2009909170320;; Brett Barrouquere, Kentucky Coach
Acquitted in Rare Player Death Case, BREITBART (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.
breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9APCPE80&show_article=1 [hereinafter Barrouquere,
Kentucky Coach Acquitted].
2. Michael McCann, Kentucky Trial of High School Coach Has Wide Implications,
SI.COM (Aug. 26, 2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/michael_mccann/
08/26/kentucky.coach/index.html;; Riley, supra note 1.
3. McCann, supra note 2.
4. Cliff Pinckard, Kentucky High School Football Coach Indicted in Connection
ZLWK 3OD\HU·V +HDW-Related Death, CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER, Jan. 23, 2009,
http://www.cleveland.com/sports/index.ssf/2009/01/kentucky_high_school_football.html.
5. McCann, supra note 2.
6. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.050 (West 2010). For details of the statute see infra,
note 120.
7. See McCann, supra note 2;; see also Barrouquere, Kentucky Coach Acquitted,
supra note 1.
8. Barrouquere, Kentucky Coach Acquitted, supra note 1.
9. From 1999²2008 twenty-eight high school or college-aged football players died
from heat-related illness, an average of 2.8 deaths per year. FREDERICK O. MUELLER &
BOB COLGATE., ANNUAL SURVEY OF FOOTBALL INJURY RESEARCH, Table IV (2009),
http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/FootballAnnual.pdf. That figure represents an increase
of 86% over the ten years previous, during which only fifteen heat-related deaths
occurred, for an average of 1.5 deaths per year. Id. The ten year period previous to
that, 1979²1988, had a similar average of 1.4 deaths per year. Id. Further, the number
of collegiate and high school football players has not been increasing by a statistically
significant amount over the previous twenty five years. See NAT·L FED·N OF STATE
HIGH SCH. ASS·NS KWWSZZZQIKVRUJ3DUWLFLSDWLRQ VHOHFW ´6SRUWV 6HDUFKµ WKHQ
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increased attention from parents, coaches and prosecutors
alike. The increasing number of heat-related deaths among
high-school and college-age football players is a serious
problem that needs to be addressed. It is my position that the
mere possibility of civil liability in such cases has not been a
sufficient deterrent. Heat-related deaths are a significant
enough problem that exploration of other avenues to deter
and avoid such deaths should be undertaken.
This comment will address several legal issues relevant to
the death of high school student-athletes from heat-related
injuries and illnesses. Part I will address the aspects of the
civil liability system that prevent it from deterring risky
behavior on the part of coaches. Part II will address some
appropriate criminal charges, using the Model Penal Code as
an analytical framework, that may deter risky behavior by
coaches.
I. POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY SYSTEM·S
DETERRENT EFFECT
Civil actions are the most common manner of imposing
legal liability upon coaches and schools for the death of
student-athletes caused by heat-related illness. A survey of
the relevant literature and case law demonstrates that
´SODLQWLIIV VKRXOGHU D IRUPLGDEOH EXUGHQµ10 when attempting
to establish a breach of the requisite standard of care.
Furthermore, in most cases, plaintiffs must also overcome
significant affirmative defenses, including assumption of the
risk and qualified immunity.11 These various hurdles are
football 11-player from the drop down menu, then select the appropriate year and state
set). This fact obviates the possibility that player deaths are merely on the rise due to
an increase in the number of players. According to the National Federation of State
High-School Football Associations, the number of players has increased by 9.2% from
2002 to 2009, to just over 1.1 million. See id. Further, Frederick O. Mueller, Ph.D.,
stated that the number of high-school football players has stayed approximately within
the 1 million player range rather consistently during his department has compiled it
annual reports, which began in 1965. Email from Frederick O. Mueller, Ph.D, to David
Marck (Sept. 27, 2009 at 09:31 EDT) (on file with author);; see also National Center for
Catastrophic Injury Research, U. N.C. CHAPEL HILL, http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/
index.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
10. Thomas R. Hurst & James N. Knight, &RDFKHV· /LDELOLW\ IRU $WKOHWHV· ,QMXULHV
and Deaths, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 27, 37 (2003).
11. Id. at 51.
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major constraints on the ability of tort law to deter activities
that lead to deaths caused by heat-related illness.
A. Proving Prima Facie Negligence
The majority of civil suits arising from heat-related death
rely upon the theory of negligence.12 It is axiomatic, therefore,
WKDWWKHSODLQWLIIQHHGVWR´SURYH  WKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWRZHG
a duty to conform to a standard of conduct established by law
for the protection of the plaintiff;; (2) that the defendant
EUHDFKHG WKDW GXW\   WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQW·V EUHDFK ZDV WKH
OHJDO FDXVH RI WKH SODLQWLII·V LQMXU\ DQG   WKDW WKH SODLQWLII
VXIIHUHGFRPSHQVDEOHLQMXU\µ13
Regarding the first element, coaches typically have a duty
to exercise reasonable care to prevent the foreseeable risk of
harm to their players.14
In Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs
Junior/Senior Public School, the Nebraska Supreme Court
IRXQG WKDW WKH SODLQWLII·V FRDFKHV RZHG KLP WKH GXW\ WR
conform to the standard of care thDW´WKHUHDVRQDEO\SUXGHQW
person holding a Nebraska teaching certificate with a
FRDFKLQJ HQGRUVHPHQWµ ZRXOG H[KLELW15 The plaintiff, Bret
Cerny, was a high-school football player who sustained head
injuries after striking his head on the ground during a
football game.16 The main issue on appeal was the standard
RI FDUH WR ZKLFK&HUQ\·VFRDFKHV VKRXOG EH KHOG17 The court
VSHFLILFDOO\ UHMHFWHG WKH ORZHU FRXUW·V ILQGLQJ WKDW FRDFKHV
would only be held to the standard of a coach untrained in
medical affairs in communities similar to the town where the
injuries or death occurred.18 As a result, the standard of care
LV QRW DIIHFWHG E\ D FRDFK·V JHRJUDSKLF ORFDWLRQ RU PHGLFDO
sophistication, or lack thereof.19 In Cerny, the effect was to
raise the standard of caUH DSSOLFDEOH WR WKH GHIHQGDQW·V
12. Id. at 32.
13. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965));; see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 164²65 (5th ed.
1984).
14. Hurst & Knight, supra note 10, at 32²33.
15. Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Junior/Senior Pub. Sch., 628 N.W.2d 697, 706 (Neb.
2001).
16. Id. at 700.
17. Id. at 703.
18. Id. at 705.
19. Id. at 706.
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actions, creating a higher duty owed to the plaintiff than
would have been owed by a coach lacking any medical
training.20
,W KDV DOVR EHHQ QRWHG WKDW ´FDVH ODZ KDV LPSRVHG
numerous [other] duties on coaches, including the duties of
supervision, proper training, providing adequate medical
FDUH DQG WKH ZDUQLQJ RI ODWHQW GDQJHUVµ21 The duty to
provide prompt and proper medical care is a typical point of
contention in litigation. In Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish
School Board, two high school football coaches were found to
have acted negligently, breaching their duty to provide
prompt and proper medical care, after taking two hours to
provide medical assistance to a player suffering from heat-
stroke.22
The deceased player, Robert Mogabgab, who
collapsed and vomited at 5:20 p.m., was helped back onto the
team bus in a semi-conscious state, and taken back with the
team to his high school.23 Upon returning to the school at
SP5REHUW·VFRDFKHVFRQVXOWHGILUVWDLGJXLGHVEXWGLd
little more than undress Robert, attempt to revive him with
an ammonia capsule, and massage his arms.24 By 5:50 p.m.,
5REHUW KDG EHFRPH ´FODPP\ SDOH >DQG@ KLV EUHDWKLQJ ZDV
KHDY\µ25 %\  SP 5REHUW KDG EHFRPH ´JUD\LVK-blue,
with his mouth hanging slightly ajar, his lips [and] hand and
DUPZHUHEOXLVKDQGKHZDVPRDQLQJµ26 Only at this point,
and prompted by the strenuous urging of an unrelated, but
FRQFHUQHG SDUHQW GLG 5REHUW·V FRDFKHV QRWLI\ KLV SDUHQWV RI
his condition.27 5REHUW·V SDUHQWV FDOled a physician who met
them at the school at 7:15 p.m., whereupon Robert was
transported to a hospital.28
The admitting physician
GHVFULEHG 5REHUW·V FRQGLWLRQ DV ´XQFRQVFLRXV F\DQRWLF FRRO
clammy, actively sweating, with no pulse in any of his major
veVVHOV QR HYLGHQFH RI SUHVVXUHµ DQG WKDW 5REHUW·V ´SXSLOV
20. ,QRUGHUWRJDLQD1HEUDVND´&RDFKLQJ&HUWLILFDWHµRQHPXVWFRPSOHWH´DFROOHJH
FRXUVHLQILUVWDLGµDVZHOO DV´DFRXUVHLQFDUHDQGSUHYHQWLRQRIDWKOHWLFLQMXULHVµ Id.
at 705.
21. Hurst & Knight, supra note 10, at 33.
22. Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 239 So. 2d 456, 457 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
23. Id. at 458²59.
24. Id. at 459.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Mogabgab, 239 So. 2d at 459.
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ZHUH ZLGHO\ GLODWHG IL[HG DQG QRW UHVSRQVLYH WR OLJKWµ29
Considering the foregoing, Robert was diagnosed as suffering
IURP ´SURIRXQG KHDW H[KDXVWLRQ ZLWK VKRFN WR DQ DGYDQFHG
degree, but not necHVVDULO\LUUHYHUVLEOHµ30 5REHUW·VFRQGLWLRQ
however, was terminal and he died the following morning at
2:30 a.m.31 The trial court dismissed the claims against the
coaches, finding that while they were negligent, the plaintiff
failed to prove that their negligence caused 5REHUW·VGHDWK32
The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court,
VWDWLQJ ´LW LV SODLQ WKDW >5REHUW·V FRDFKHV@ ZHUH QHJOLJHQW LQ
denying the boy medical assistance and in plying an ill-chosen
ILUVWDLGµ33 The appellate court viewed the negligence as self-
evident from the facts, choosing to focus its analysis on the
link between duty and causation.34 As such, the court viewed
the duty to provide prompt and proper medical care as
directly related to the issue of causation. The court reasoned
that injury related to heat stroke becomes progressively worse
with time, eventually reaching a point at which the injured
person can no longer recover.35 Finally, the court noted that
the plaintiff need not prove to a certainty that the decedent
would have survived if proper medical care was provided. 36
Rather, the plaintiff needed to show this only by a
preponderance of the evidence.37 In order to meet the
preponderance of evidence standard, the court of appeals
relied on statements from Robert·V WUHDWLQJ SK\VLFLDQ WKDW LI
Robert had been taken to the hospital thirty minutes earlier,

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 460.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Mogabgab, 239 So. 2d at 460²61.
35. Id. at 460 (´7KH EHVW V\QWKHVLV RI WKH PHGLFDO HYLGHQFH LV WKDW KHDW GDPDJH
works its wreckage upon the body in a continuum, causing progressive internal changes
in the human system much as it causes progressive organic changes in a boiling egg. At
some indefinite point in this continuum the process of heat damage becomes
LUUHYHUVLEOHDQGSDVWWKDWSRLQWOLWWOHFDQEHGRQHµ 
36. See id.
37. Id. ´&DVXDOLW\>VLF@ OLNH PRst other facts in a civil action, may be proved by a
preponderance of the relevant evidence. Stripped of unfortunate jargon concerning
certainty, proof by a preponderance of evidence requires only that a litigant satisfy the
court or jury by sufficient evidence that the existence of a fact is more probable or likely
WKDQLWVQRQH[LVWHQFHµ
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it would have been unlikely he would have died.38
Thus, a coach is required to be aware and attempt to
prevent foreseeable risks;; properly supervise and care for
their players;; and, most importantly in heat-stroke cases,
provide prompt and adequate medical care. A court will
measure whether or not a coach meets these duties by
comparing his actions to those of a similarly certified coach or
teacher. As seen in Mogabgab, breach of the requisite
VWDQGDUG RI FDUH FDQ EH SURYHQ E\ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ D FRDFK·V
´VHULRXV LQDWWHQWLRQ LJQRUDQFH DQG LQGLIIHUHQFH WR D SOD\HU·V
well-EHLQJµ39
B. Defenses to Negligence Claims
The two most likely defenses to a lawsuit brought by the
family or estate of a player injured or killed due to a heat-
related illness are assumption of the risk and qualified
immunity.
In addition, a statutory cap may limit the
damages a plaintiff can collect, even if successful.
1. Express Assumption of the Risk
Assumption of the risk is a traditional common-law
defense, of which there are two major types.
Express
assumption of the risk occurs when the plaintiff has given his
or her express consent via a formal release or other
exculpatory agreement, relieving the defendant of liability for
´ULVN RI KDUP DULVLQJ IURP WKH GHIHQGDQW·V QHJOLJHQW RU
UHFNOHVV FRQGXFWµ40 7KH GHIHQVH LV QRW DYDLODEOH ´LI WKH
DJUHHPHQW LV LQYDOLG DV FRQWUDU\ WR SXEOLF SROLF\µ41 Express
assumption of the risk does not usually serve as a viable
defense in heat-related suits because contracts exempting
schools from providing the duties listed above have been
found to be contrary to public policy.42
Regarding releases43 from liability, Wagenblast v. Odessa
38. Id. at 461.
39. Hurst & Knight, supra note 10, at 37;; Mogabgab, 239 So. 2d at 457.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965).
41. Id.
42. Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal Liability
RI&RDFKHVIRUD6SRUWV3DUWLFLSDQW·V,QMXULHV, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 56 (1996).
43. 5HOHDVHLVGHILQHGKHUHLQDVD´VXUUHQGHURIWKHULJKWWRVXHµ See id. at 54.
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School District is instructive and illuminating.44 In order to
participate in interscholastic athletics, the Odessa School
'LVWULFW ´'LVWULFW·  UHTXLUHG VWXGHQWV DQG WKHLU SDUHQWV WR
VLJQDVWDQGDUGL]HGIRUPUHOHDVLQJWKH'LVWULFWIURP´OLDELOLW\
resulting from any ordinary negligence that may arise in
FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH VFKRRO GLVWULFW·V LQWHUVFKRODVWLF DFWLYLWLHV
SURJUDPVµ45
Parents of affected students sought an
injunction barring the use of the releases. 46 The trial court
found for the plaintiffs, holding that the release was an
´XQFRQscionable contract of adhesion and that the School
'LVWULFW·VDWWHPSWWROLPLWLWVOLDELOLW\LVYRLGDVDJDLQVWSXEOLF
SROLF\µ47
The District appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. 48
,Q DIILUPLQJ WKH WULDO FRXUW·V KROGLQJ WKH :DVKLQJWRQ
Supreme Court sWDWHG WKDW ´WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW WKH UHOHDVH
portions of these forms represent consent to relieve the school
districts of their duty of care, they are invalid whether they
DUH WHUPHG UHOHDVHV RU H[SUHVV DVVXPSWLRQV RI ULVNµ49 The
Court also found that generally releases should be subject to a
six-part test to determine whether they violate public policy.50
In addition to releases, courts have also viewed
exculpatory agreements51 as suspect.52 6SHFLILFDOO\ ´LI DQ
agreement is ambiguous or covers a definite time, place, or
44. See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist., 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988).
45. Id. at 969.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 848.
49. Id. at 973²74.
50. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at 56²57 n.247 (summarizing the
Wagenblast IDFWRUV DV ´  WKH ODZ·V UHOXFWDQFH WR SHUPLW WKRVH FKDUJHG ZLWK D SXEOLF
duty to discharge this duty by contract;; 2) disparity in bargaining power;; 3) the
¶LPSRUWDQFHRIWKHVHUYLFHSURYLGHG· ZKHWKHUWKHSDUW\¶KROGVKLPVHOIRXWDVZLOOLQJ
WRSHUIRUPWKLVVHUYLFHIRUDQ\PHPEHURIWKHSXEOLFZKRVHHNVLW· VLQFHDUHOHDVH
may arguably be a contract of adhesion, whether or not the party seeking the release
¶PDNHV    SURYLVLRQV ZKHUHE\ D SXUFKDVHU PD\ SD\ DGGLWLRQDO UHDVRQDEOH IHHV DQG
REWDLQSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWQHJOLJHQFH·DQG ZKHWKHUWKHUHOHDVLQJSDUW\LVLQHVVHQFH
placed under the control of the party seeking the release, which is only limited by that
SDUW\·V UHFNOHVVQHVVµ   7KH Wagenblast court adopted its test almost verbatim from
Tunkl v. Regents of University. of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. Sup. Ct. (1963). See
McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at 55²56 n.242.
51. ´([FXOSDWRU\ DJUHHPHQWµ LV KHUHLQ GHILQHG DV ´ZKHQ RQH H[SUHVVO\ DJUHHV WR
accept a risk of harm ariVLQJIURPDQRWKHU·VFRQGXFWZKLFKLQWXUQPD\EHHQIRUFHDEOH
DJDLQVWWKDWLQGLYLGXDOµ McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at 60.
52. Id.

NECESSARY ROUGHNESS

2011]

1/31/2011 5:31 PM

Necessary Roughness

185

risk, it will not be interpreted to release a tortfeasor from
liability for harm occurring at another time and place or in a
GLIIHUHQW PDQQHUµ53 $FFRUGLQJO\ ´H[FXOSDWRU\ DJUHHPHQWV
are usually not enforced against persons not a party to them,
QRUDUHWKHDJUHHPHQWVOLNHO\WREHHIIHFWLYHDJDLQVWPLQRUVµ54
2. Implied Assumption of the Risk
,PSOLHG DVVXPSWLRQ RI ULVN RFFXUV ZKHQ ´D SODLQWLII ZKR
fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things
FDXVHG E\ WKH GHIHQGDQW·V FRQGXFW . .and who nevertheless
voluntarily chooses to enter or remain. . .under circumstances
that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to
UHFRYHU IRU KDUP ZLWKLQWKDW ULVNµ55 Despite that seemingly
broad definition, implied assumption of the risk will not apply
´LQDQ\VLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKDQH[SUHVVDJUHHPHQWWRDFFHSWWKH
ULVNZRXOGEHLQYDOLGDVFRQWUDU\WRSXEOLFSROLF\µ56 In other
words, if the player, or his parents, could not waive his rights
to sue or otherwise exculpate the coaches or school, due to the
public policy concerns outlined in Wagenblast and Tunkl,57
then the defense will not be able to allege that the player
impliedly assumed such a risk. Accordingly, although a
plaintiff cannot assume the risk of his coach breaching his
duty of care, but may impliedly accept the dangers inherent in
the activity.58 As such, the determination of those risks that
are inherent in an activity and those that have been impliedly
accepted by the player is critical. If the coach can successfully
portray the injuries as those that a player, or his parents,
impliedly assumes from participation in the respective sport,
including practices, then he may be successful in his defense.
Primary implied assumption of risk59 arises when the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C(1) (1965).
56. § 496C(2).
57. See supra notes 44²50 and accompanying text.
58. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at  ´>3@DUWLFLSDQWVGRQRWFRQVHQWWR
WKHULVNRIQHJOLJHQWVXSHUYLVLRQµ 
59. Id. at 44 n.191 (explaining that secondary implied assumption of risk covers
LQVWDQFHV ´ZKHUH WKH GHIHQGDQW KDV LQ IDFW EUHDFKHG KLV RU KHU GXW\ WR WKH SODLQWLIIµ
DQG \HW WKH SODLQWLII NQRZLQJO\ ´DZDUH RI WKH ULVN«YROXQWDULO\ HQFRXQWHUV LWµ  The
affirmative defense of secondary implied assumption of risk has been omitted from this
comment because it is not relevant herein. It is not relevant because a minor cannot
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´GHIHQGDQW ZDV QRW QHJOLJHQW Eecause he or she either owed
no duty to the plaintiff or did not breach a duty that was
RZHGµ60 If the injuries sustained by the plaintiff are the type
inherent in the sport, the coach and school will not be liable,
as primary implied assumption of the risk will completely bar
recovery. In order to determine whether a risk is inherent in
DQ DFWLYLW\ D FRXUW ZLOO FRQVLGHU ´WKH QDWXUH RI WKH DFWLYLW\
the relationship of the defendant to the activity, and the
relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff.µ61 Examples of
risks that courts have deemed objectively inherent in their
respective sports are falling out of a boxing ring,62 being
struck in the face by a wild pitch in a little league game,63 and
being tackled in a high-school football game.64
Some courts have applied a subjective element to the
implied assumption of the risk analysis.65 In Vendrell v.
School District No. 26C, the court held that the plaintiff,
considering his previous participation in the sport of football,
DVVXPHG WKH ´REYLRXV ULVN DWWHQGDQW XSRQ EHLQJ WDFNOHGµ66
Therefore, according to Vendrell, unless the defendant has
increased the risks inherent in a sport WKHQ WKH SODLQWLII·V
assumption of the risk will be considered a viable defense.67
Whether a heat-related death ² without a breach of duty
by the defendant ² constitutes an objectively inherent risk in
the practice and play of football is an interesting issue that
LPSOLHGO\DFFHSWWKHULVNVDULVLQJIURPDFRDFK·VEUHDFKRIKLVGXW\WRWKHSOD\HUSee §
496C(2) (´>,mplied assumption of risk] does not apply in any situation in which an
H[SUHVV DJUHHPHQW WR DFFHSW WKH ULVN ZRXOG EH LQYDOLG DV FRQWUDU\ WR SXEOLF SROLF\µ 
Accordingly, if the minor would not have been able to expressly assume the risks
arising from his coach breaching the duty owed to him, for reasons of public policy, see
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, (Cal. Sup. Ct. (1963), then he will not
be able to impliedly assume such a risk.
60. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at 43²44 n.191 (citing John L.
Diamond, Assumption of Risk After Comparative Negligence: Integrating Contract
Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 731 (1991)).
61. Foronda v. Haw,QW·O%R[LQJ&OXE 25 P.3d 826, 841 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001).
62. See id. at 826.
63. See Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 4th 47, 49 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991).
64. See Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 376 P.2d 406, 409 (Or. 1962).
65. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at 42.
66. Vendrell, 476 P.2d at 414.
67. Hurst & Knight, supra note 10, DW ´>,@QFDVHVZKHUHDQLQVWUXFWRULVIRXQG
WRKDYHDFWHG¶VRDVWRLQFUHDVHWKHULVNRIKDUPLQKHUHQWLQDSDUWLFXODUVSRUW·LVWKDW
instruFWRU GHSULYHG RI WKH GHIHQVH RI SULPDU\ DVVXPSWLRQ RI ULVNµ TXRWLQJ Balthazor,
62 Cal. App. 4th at 47)).
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has not been explored in relevant case law. Regardless, this
is more of a hypothetical than a common occurrence. The
typical aggravating circumstance in heat-related deaths is not
the initial collapse of the player, but rather the supposed
breach of duty and the facts surrounding it, such as the
failure to render proper medical care,68 or running an
especially brutal practice,69 that is the allegedly causal factor
in the death of the player.
A player, or his parents, cannot impliedly assume the risks
flowing from a subsequent breach by his coach. Therefore,
assumption of the risk is likely not a viable defense for a
coach in the case of heat-related illness. Implied assumption
of the risk is a better fit in instances in which participation in
football or other athletics may be dangerous without a breach
by a coach. The question of whether the coach breached his
duty is a highly fact sensitive question for the jury. Moreover,
express assumption of the risk will likely not be a successful
defense in cases involving minors, their schools and their
agents (coaches) due to the rule laid out in Wagenblast.70
Although coaches may not always rely on the defense of
assumption of the risk in circumstances such as those in the
deaths of Robert Mogabgab and Max Gilpin, the following
defense has had a large impact on these types of cases.
3. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that is a
derivative of sovereign immunity.71 It releases government
employees from personal liability IRU ´GDPDJHV DULVLQJ IURP
WKHLU¶GLVFUHWLRQDU\·DFWVDVRSSRVHGWR¶PLQLVWHULDOIXQFWLRQV·
[when] taken in good faith [and] within the scope of their
DXWKRULW\µ72 An employee is acting within the scope of his
DXWKRULW\ ´ZKHQ >KLV DFWLRQV@ DUH LQFLGHQWDO WR KLV UHJXODU
duties as such an employee and are of some benefit to the

68. See Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 239 So. 2d 456, 460 (La. Ct. App.
1970).
69. See Riley, supra note 1
70. See supra text accompanying note 49.
71. See BLACK·S LAW DICTIONARY WK HG   ´$ JRYHUQPHQW·V LPPXQLW\IURP
EHLQJVXHGLQLWVRZQFRXUWVZLWKRXWLWVFRQVHQWµ 
72. Hurst & Knight, supra note 10, at 43.
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HPSOR\HU DQG QRW SHUVRQDO WR WKH HPSOR\HHµ73 As qualified
LPPXQLW\FUHDWHVDEURDGSURWHFWLRQRYHU HPSOR\HH·VDFWLRQV
most states require that the employee act grossly negligently,
fraudulently, or in bad faith in order for a plaintiff to
RYHUFRPH D JRYHUQPHQW HPSOR\HH·V DIILUPDWLYH TXDOLILHG
immunity defense.74 Accordingly, the main issue a court
needs to resolve regarding qualified immunity is whether the
GHIHQGDQW·VDOOHJHGO\QHJOLJHQWFRQGXFWZDV´GLVFUHWLRQDU\µ
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has outlined several
factors for determining if the actions of a government
employee were discretionary.75 The South Dakota Supreme
Court, in Gasper v. Freidel, summarized and outlined the
factors as:
1)

The nature and importance of the function that the officer is
performing . . . .

2)

The extent to which passing judgment on the exercise of
discretion by the officer will amount necessarily to passing
judgment by the court on the conduct of a coordinate branch of
government . . . .

3)

The extent to which the imposition of liability would impair the
free exercise of his discretion by the officer . . . .

4)

The extent to which the ultimate financial responsibility will
fall on the officer . . . .

5)

The likelihood that harm will result to members of the public if
the action is taken . . . .

6)

The nature and seriousness of the type of harm that may be
produced . . . .

7)

The availability to the injured party of other remedies and
other forms of relief.76

Other courts have added to that list, including factors such
DV´SHUVRQDO GHOLEHUDWLRQµ77 ´GLIILFXOW GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJµ78 and
´WKH DELOLty of public officers to engage in making a decision
73. See BALLENTINE·S LAW DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1969). For the purposes of this
comment it is assumed that a coach is acting within the scope of his employment when
he is conducting a practice.
74. Id. at 44²47.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D (1965).
76. Gasper v. Freidel, 450 N.W.2d 226, 230 (S.D. 1990) (quoting § 895D cmt. f).
77. Lennon v. Petersen, 624 So. 2d 171, 174 (Ala. 1993).
78. Id.
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E\ZHLJKLQJWKHSROLFLHVIRUDQGDJDLQVWLWµ79 The touchstone
for all of the factors is whether the actions at issue in the
OLWLJDWLRQ ´UHTXLUHG GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ DQG WKH XVH RI
MXGJPHQWµ80 compared to a purely ministerial function such
as filling out paper-work or other non-optional activities
XQGHUWDNHQDWDVXSHULRU·VEHKHVW81
In Gasper, two high-school football coaches were sued by a
student-DWKOHWH·VSDUHQWVRYHUDQLQMXU\VXVWDLQHGE\DSOD\HU
at a summer weightlifting and conditioning program. 82 The
WULDO FRXUW IRXQG TXDOLILHG LPPXQLW\ DSSOLHG WR WKH FRDFKHV·
activity because the practice was within the scope of the
FRDFKHV·HPSOR\PHQW83 the coaches were not grossly negligent
in running it,84 and choosing to run the program was an
H[HUFLVHRIWKHFRDFKHV·GLVFUHWLRQDU\SRZHUV85 The court held
WKDW LPSRVLQJ OLDELOLW\ LQ VXFK FLUFXPVWDQFHV ZRXOG ´LPSDLU
WKH IUHH H[HUFLVH RI GLVFUHWLRQµ86 reserved to a coach. The
court reasoned that conditioning is considered an important
function left to the discretion of the coach.87
In Lennon v. Petersen, the Alabama Supreme Court found
that a coach was exercising his discretionary powers, even
though the plaintiff alleged that the coach exceeded his
DXWKRULW\ E\ ´GLVFourag[ing] players from seeking treatment
IRU WKHLU LQMXULHVµ88 7KH FRXUW UHDVRQHG WKDW WKH FRDFK·V
GLVFUHWLRQDU\ IXQFWLRQV LQFOXGHG ´difficult decisions [such as]
determining whether a player was injured and should report
to the trainer or whether the player was merely faking an
injury to avoid practice. . . µ89
79. Id.
80. Id. at 174²75.
81. See § 895D FPW K ´0LQLVWHULDO DFWV DUHWKRVH GRQH E\RIILFHUV DQG HPSOR\HHV
who are required to carry out the orders of others or to administer the law with little
choice as to when, where, how or under what circumstances their acts are to be done.
Examples of acts held to be ministerial under ordinary circumstances are the
preparation of ballots, the registration of voters, the recording of documents and filing
RISDSHUVµ 
82. Gasper, 450 N.W.2d at 228.
83. Id. at 231.
84. Id. (the plaintiff had been instructed as to proper use of the equipment and
warming up.)
85. Id.
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id.
88. Lennon v. Petersen, 624 So. 2d 171, 173 (Ala. 1993).
89. Id. at 174²75 (emphasis added).
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As applied to negligent heat stroke deaths sustained by
high-school athletes in the course of a relatively normal
practice, qualified immunity serves as a strong bar to
personal civil liability for the coaches involved. Very few
VWDWHV KDYH DGRSWHG WKH 5HVWDWHPHQW 6HFRQG  RI 7RUWV· UXOH
that qualified immunity is unavailable in instances of
negligence. In fact, the majority of states have adopted laws
closer to those outlined above, which require gross negligence
or bad faith to preclude qualified immunity from protecting
the otherwise discretionary actions of a coach.90 In the end,
and in all but the most egregious circumstances, qualified
immunity will shield a coach from personal liability. This bar
to recovery reduces the deterrent effect of the civil liability
system.
4. Sovereign Immunity and Damage Caps
By limiting recoveries for plaintiffs, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and the statutory caps placed on
damages also prevent the civil liability system from
functioning as a sufficient deterrent in instances of student-
athlete heat-related deaths.91 Considering the difficulty in
finding coaches personally liable due to the qualified
immunity defense, plaintiffs typically and understandably
DWWHPSW WR VXH WKH FRDFKHV· HPSOR\HU IROORZLQJ WKH GHDWK RU
injury of a player. The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies
in these instances because the coaches are usually employed
by the local public school district, which is generally
considered part of the sovereign.92
90. Hurst & Knight, supra note 10, DW  ´7KXV XQGHU WKH FRPPRQ ODZ FRDFKHV
acting within the scope of their employment in tasks requiring the exercise of discretion
are largely shielded from personal liability by qualified immunity. Furthermore,
modern statutes waiving sovereign immunity may provide sweeping immunity from
personal liability for public employees, with respect to all but certain narrow categories
RIRXWUDJHRXVRULOOHJDODFWVµ 
91. Clay Travis, Are Laws Too Weak, Damages Too Low to Prevent Heat-Related
Deaths?, NCAA FOOTBALL FANHOUSE (Aug. 12, 2009), http://ncaafootball.fanhouse.com/
2009/08/12/are-laws-too-weak-damages-too-low-to-prevent-heat-related-death/ (´(ven if
employees of those places happen to be negligent, no verdict is going to be so large as to
send a message that heat-UHODWHGGHDWKVDUHQ·WWREHWULIOHGZLWKµ 
92. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at  ´*HQHUDOO\ VFKRRO ERDUGV KDYH
been given the broad exceptions of immunity in various ways. Additionally, other
JRYHUQPHQWDO ´DFWRUVµ KDYH EHHQ DIIRUGHG VXFK LPPXQLW\ For example, one
Pennsylvania court broadly interpreted the defLQLWLRQRIDQ´HPSOR\HHµWRLQFOXGHDKLJK
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$OWKRXJK HDFK VWDWH·V VRYHUHLJQ LPPXQLW\ VWDWXWH GLIIHUV
a general rule can be stated: sovereign immunity
HQFDSVXODWHVWKH´SULQFLSOHWKDWWKHVRYHUHLJQFDQQRWEHVXHG
in its own courts or in any other court without its consent and
permission;; a principle which applies with full force to the
VHYHUDO VWDWHV RI WKH 8QLRQµ93 Although most states waive
their sovereign immunity³to some degree³via statute,94
requirements for finding liability vary widely by state, and
many jurisdictions do not allow plaintiffs to collect punitive
damages.95 Many states also cap damages at $500,000.96
Additionally, some states require gross negligence before a
plaintiff can recover from the state. For example, Kansas
requires gross negligence before the public entity can be found
liable.97 Kansas caps damages at $500,000 unless the public
entity, the school district, has insurance for a greater amount,
while also barring any recovery of punitive damages.98 Other
VWDWHV OLNH 2NODKRPD ´VSHFLILFDOO\ H[HPSW>@ OLDELlity for any
LQMXU\ LQFXUUHG LQ ¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ RU SUDFWLFH IRU DQ\
interscholastic or other athletic contest sponsored or
conducted by or on the property of the state or a public
VXEGLYLVLRQ·µ99 If the school, however, has purchased liability
insurance, it will be liable up to the amount of the
insurance.100
Even in states that allow plaintiffs to recovery for the
mere negligence of a public employee, the states greatly limit
damages.
Oregon,101
Pennsylvania,102
Mississippi,103
school football player who had worn the jersey of a particular school district and had
UHSUHVHQWHGKLPVHOIE\DFWLQJRQEHKDOIRIWKDWGLVWULFWµ 
93. BALLENTINE·S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added).
94. McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 42, at  ´>,@QUHFHQW\HDUVFRPPHQWDWRUV
have noted that sovereign immunity has been eliminated or limited substantially in a
majority of states. With a few exceptions, school districts and their employees can now
EHKHOGOLDEOHIRULQMXULHVµ 
95. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6105(c) (2008);; OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 162(d)
(2009).
96. See infra notes 101²13.
97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(o) (2008).
98. Id. § 75-6105(a), (c).
99. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155(20) (2009).
100. Herweg v. Bd. of Educ. of the Lawton Pub. Schs., 673 P.2d 154, 157 (Okla.
1983).
101. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (2007).
102. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528 (2009) ($1,000,000 recovery cap in actions against
the commonwealth);; id. § 8553 ($500,000 recovery cap in actions against local
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Louisiana,104 and Idaho,105 among others, have recovery limits
of $500,000 per incident. Many other states, including
Colorado,106
Florida,107
Kentucky,108
Maine,109
110
111
112
Massachusetts,
Rhode Island,
Ohio,
and Virginia113
have caps with even lower limits, ranging from $100,000 to
$400,000.
Many states also require the plaintiff to provide the state
or public entity with notice of a claim or incident within a
specified period of time, such as ninety days or six months.114
Without providing proper notice a subsequent civil suit will
fail.115 In addition to the notice requirement, most states also
have a shorter statute of limitations for claims against the
state.116
This limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and the
damage caps and filing procedures that go along with that
waiver, make it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in suits
against school districts. When combined with the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity available to coaches, this leaves
many guardians of deceased student-athletes with a lower
chance of a successful and meaningful suit. The lack of
million dollar judgments in cases of heat-related deaths, and
the concomitant inability of the civil liability system to
function as a deterrent to risky behavior on the part of
coaches, has prevented this issue from being sufficiently
addressed by states, schools or coaches. If this issue was
[municipal] agencies).
103. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-   EDUVSXQLWLYHGDPDJHVDQGDWWRUQH\·VIHHV
unless otherwise specifically authorized).
104. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106 (2009).
105. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-926 (2009).
106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114 (2009).
107. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2009).
108. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.070(5) (West 2010).
109. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8105(1) (2009).
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 258, § 2 (2009).
111. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 (2009).
112. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2744.05(C)(1) (West 2010).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2009).
114. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-8 (2009) (ninety days);; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
5522(a)(1) (2009) (six months).
115. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:8-8;; PA. CONS. STAT. § 5522(a)(1).
116. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821 (2009) (one year statute of limitations
in actions against the state) with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (2009) (two year
statute of limitation for private actions related to an injury or death).
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being sufficiently addressed, and coaches were deterred from
running dangerous practices or were aware of the proper
medical procedures, then heat-related deaths may not have
increased by 86% over the past decade.117
II. UTILIZATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO
REDUCE HEAT-RELATED DEATHS
Due to the structural problems underlying the civil
liability system, and its inability to function as a sufficient
deterrent to student-athlete heat-related deaths, some
commentators have explored a turn to the criminal justice
system to accomplish the goal of deterrence.118 In fact, the
mere possibility of criminal liability for coaches has already
led to changes.119 This provides further proof of the efficacy of
criminal liability as a mechanism to spur reform on the state,
school, and coaching level.
Precipitating these reforms was the trial of David Jason
Stinson for the death of Max Gilpin based upon the theory of
Negligent Homicide.120 The Gilpin-Stinson case marked the
117. See supra note 9.
118. Travis, supra note 91.
119. Dan Fitzgerald, Friday Night Rights: Kentucky v. Stinson to Trigger Changes
in High School Athletics, CONN. SPORTS L. (Sept. 23, 2009), http://ctsportslaw.com/
2009/09/23/friday-night-rights-kentucky-v-stinson-to-trigger-changes-in-high-school-
athletics/ (outlining the effects of the Stinson case, such as legislative changes ²
´>F@RDFKHV LQ WKH &RPPRQZHDOWK QRZ PXVW WDNH D -hour online course that covers
topics from temperature-UHODWHG LOOQHVVHV WR KHDG QHFN DQG IDFLDO LQMXULHVµ ² and
contractual changes between the school and coach, and other changes in coaching
doctrine ² ´>W>KHFXOWXUHRIFRDFKLQJLVERXQGWRFKDQJH The tough, old-school methods
of toughening a team up ² especially in football ² are likely to become relics of the
SDVWµ 
120. It must be noted at this point that although the Kentucky statute that Stinson
ZDVFKDUJHGXQGHULVWHUPHG´5HFNOHVV+RPLFLGHµ see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.050,
WKHVWDQGDUGIRU´UHFNOHVVQHVVµDVGHILQHGE\VHFWLRQ  DQGLQWHUSUHWHGE\WKH
Kentucky Supreme Court is something closer to Model Penal Code negligence rather
than recklessness. Compare Robinson v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 183, 184²85 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding and applying KY. REV. STAT. ANN´>W@KHJUDYDPHQ
of the offense is the failure to perceive a substantial and unjustified risk when such
failure is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation. It is obvious that no specific intent that the act or omission
cause injury is required. Nor is there any requirement to show a subjective realization
RQWKHSDUWRIWKHDFWRUWKDWKLVFRQGXFWFUHDWHVDVXEVWDQWLDOULVNµ HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
with MODEL PENAL CODE   G    ´$SHUVRQDFWVnegligently with respect to
a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The
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first time a coach was criminally charged for the death of one
of his players as the result of a heat-related injury.121 The
6WDWH FKDUJHG 6WLQVRQ IROORZLQJ *LOSLQ·V GHDWK ZKLFK
occurred during an August 20, 2008 practice at Pleasure
Ridge Park High School in Louisville, Kentucky.122 The basis
RI WKH SURVHFXWLRQ·V FKDUJH ZDV QRW WKDW 6WLQVRQ IDLOHG WR
render proper medical care, as was the case in Mogabgab,123
but rather that Stinson ran a brutal and ´EDUEDULFµ SUDFWLFH
DQG ´ZLWKKHOG ZDWHU IURP SOD\HUV DQG UDQ WKHP
excessively . . . the day Max collapsed because he was angry
WKDWSOD\HUVZHUHQ·WSUDFWLFLQJKDUGWHOOLQJWKHPWKH\ZRXOG
UXQ XQWLO VRPHRQH TXLW WKH WHDPµ124
Effectively, the
prosecution alleged that Stinson should have been aware, due
to his heat-related illness training, that doubling the number
of wind-VSULQWV WKH SOD\HUV KDG WR UXQ LQ WKDW GD\·V QLQHW\-
IRXU GHJUHH KHDW ZDV DW D PLQLPXP D ´IDLOXUH WR SHUFHLYH LW
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
UHDVRQDEOHSHUVRQZRXOGREVHUYHLQWKHVLWXDWLRQµ125
6WLQVRQ·V GHIHQVH UHVWHG RQ WKH WHVWLPRQ\ RI VHYHUDO
players who stated that they did not run significantly more
sprints than normal that day.126
Further, the defense
SURFXUHG *LOSLQ·V stepmother, along with three of his
FODVVPDWHV ZKR WHVWLILHG ´WKDW *LOSLQ FRPSODLQHG RI QRW
feeling well throughout the day he collapsed.µ127 The defense
also produced medical experts who opined ´WKDWLWDSSHDUHGD
combination of heat, the use of the dietary supplement
ULVN PXVW EH RI VXFK D QDWXUH DQG GHJUHH WKDW WKH DFWRU·V IDLOXUH WR SHUFHLYH LW
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
REVHUYHLQWKHDFWRU·VVLWXDWLRQµ HPSKDVLVDGGHG  For the purposes of this comment,
I will refer to the standard that Stinson was tried under as criminal negligence, for the
touchstone of the charge was failure to perceive a risk, rather than conscious disregard
of a risk, which is the core of a recklessness charge based on Model Penal Code section
  F  ´$ SHUVRQ DFWV recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
HOHPHQWH[LVWVRUZLOOUHVXOWIURPKLVFRQGXFWµ  F  HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
121. McCann, supra note 2.
122. Barrouquere, Kentucky Coach Acquitted, supra note 1;; Riley, supra note 1.
123. Mogabgab v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 239 So. 2d 456, 457 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
124. Riley, supra note 1.
125. KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.050;; Robinson, 569 S.W.2d at 184²85;; Riley, supra
note 1.
126. Barrouquere, Kentucky Coach Acquitted, supra note 1.
127. Id.
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creatine and attention deficit disorder drug Adderall, and
EHLQJ LOO ZHUH WKH PDLQ IDFWRUV WKDW FRQWULEXWHG WR *LOSLQ·V
GHDWK ZKLFK WKH\ FDOOHG DQ DFFLGHQWµ128 /DVWO\ WKH ´WKH
defense brought in several experts who said Max was not
GHK\GUDWHG DIWHU KLV FROODSVHµ129 indicating to the jury that
WKH FDXVH RI 0D[·V GHDWK ZHUH IDFWRUV XQLTXH WR 0D[ UDWKHU
than actions Stinson took or risks he should have avoided.130
The jury returned its verdict after only ninety minutes,
finding Stinson not guilty.131 Although there was no detailed
finding of fact by the jury, some light may be shed on their
view of the case by the comments of one of the jury members.
Speaking anonymously, one of the eight male jurors132 stated
that the verdict was D ´QR EUDLQHUµ DQG WKH RYHUZKHOPLQJ
medical testimony was the most persuasive part of the case. 133
7KH MXURU GLG QRW ´IHHO OLNH WKH FRDFK GLG DQ\WKLQJ ZURQJ WR
KXUW 0D[ *LOSLQµ134 Furthermore, the juror stated that the
other jurors felt the same way and that in actuality they only
deliberated for thirty-five minutes. 135
A. Model Penal Code Section 210.4 ³ Negligent Homicide
The Stinson case serves as a good jumping-off point for an
investigation into the types of criminal charges that states
may use to confer criminal liability onto coaches. The Model
Penal Code (MPC), and its commentaries, lay out the
standard and policy behind the theory of negligent homicide,
one such criminal charge.136 The comments to section 210.4
VWDWH WKDW WKH VHFWLRQ ´UHFRJQL]HV WKDW penal sanctions are
DSSURSULDWHLQVRPHFDVHVRILQDGYHUWHQWKRPLFLGHµDQGVHHNV
´SULPDULO\ WR UDWLRQDOL]H WKH FRQFHSW RI QHJOLJHQFH WKDW PD\
serve as an appropriate basis for punishing inadvertent
128. Id.
129. Riley, supra note 1.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (The jury was composed of eight men and four women).
133. Juror: 6WLQVRQ 9HUGLFW :DV D ´1R %UDLQHUµ, WHAS11.COM (Sept. 21, 2009),
http://www.whas11.com/news/local/64440907.html.
134. Id.
135. Id. ´,ZDVDPD]HGWKDWZHZHUHDOORQWKHVDPHSDJH7KHUHZHUHROGHUSHRSOH
younger people, middle aged people, and it was amazing all of us were on the same page
VRZHDOOPXVW·YHKHDUGWKHVDPHWKLQJRXWRIWKDWFRXUWURRPµ 
136. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (1962).
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KRPLFLGHµ137 Defining negligence, the MPC states in section
2.02(2)(d) that:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an
offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
DFWRU·VIDLOXUHWRSHUFHLYHLWFRQVLGHULQJWKHQDWXUHDQGSXUSRVHRI
his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
REVHUYHLQWKHDFWRU·VVLWXDWLRQ.138

Moreover, the commentaries to the MPC stress that
HSLWKHWV VXFK DV ´ZDQWRQ GLVUHJDUGµ139 previously used in
states under the common law, were eschewed in favor of a
standard that is external, objective, and based upon the
´UHDVRQDEOHPDQµ140 This external standard derives from the
´FULWLFDO LVVXH RI WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH ULVN RI GHDWKµ DQG
whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances would
have foreseen that risk.141 8OWLPDWHO\ ´WKDW >WKH GHIHQGDQW@
does not view his conduct as dangerous is of no
FRQVHTXHQFHµ142
The Commentaries to the MPC address and justify the
policy behind ascribing criminal liability for negligent
homicide from both utilitarian and moral/retributive angles.
$GGUHVVLQJ WKH XWLOLWDULDQ FRQFHUQV WKDW ´WKH LQDGYHUWHnt
actor by definition does not perceive the risks of his conduct,
DQG WKXV FDQQRW EH GHWHUUHG IURP ULVN FUHDWLRQµ143 the
GUDIWHUV RI WKH FRGH QRWHG WKDW ´>F@ULPLQDO SXQLVKPHQW RI
negligent homicide is not impotent to stimulate care that
might otherwise not EHWDNHQQRULVDSHUVRQ·VIDLOXUHWRXVH
his faculties for the protection of others an improper basis for
FRQGHPQDWLRQµ144 0RUHRYHU WKH 03& ´LQVLVWV RQ SURRI RI
VXEVWDQWLDOIDXOWDQGOLPLWVSHQDOVDQFWLRQWRFDVHVZKHUH¶WKH
significance of the circumstances of fact would be apparent to
RQH ZKR VKDUHV WKH FRPPXQLW\·V JHQHUDO VHQVH RI ULJKW DQG
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. explanatory note of section.
Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
§ 210.4 cmt. 2.
Id.
§ 210.4 cmt.2 n.19 (quoting People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 131 (N.Y. 1956)).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 cmt.2 n.19.
§ 210.4 cmt. 3.
Id.
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ZURQJ·µ145 &RQFOXGLQJ WKH GUDIWHUV QRWHG WKDW ´>M@XVWLFH LV
safeguarded by insisting upon . . . gross deviation from
RUGLQDU\VWDQGDUGVRIFRQGXFWµDQG´>O@LDELOity for inadvertent
risk creation is properly limited to cases where the actor is
grossly insensitive to the interests and claims of other persons
LQ VRFLHW\µ146 Addressing penalties, the drafters noted that,
by deeming negligent homicide a third degree felony and
recommending between one and five year sentences, the
´VDQFWLRQV GR QRW VHHP H[FHVVLYHµ147 and their approach
constitutes a considerable relaxing of possible sentences that
defendants could have faced compared to common law
involuntary manslaughter statutes.148
Considering the finding of the Stinson jury, one may
conclude that negligent homicide is an unlikely candidate for
expanding imposition of criminal liability onto allegedly
negligent coaches. That conclusion may be in error. The
statement by the juror in the Stinson trial that he did not
´IHHO OLNH WKH FRDFK KDG GRQH DQ\WKLQJ ZURQJ WR KXUW 0D[
*LOSLQµ149 may indicate that the jury misunderstood, to some
extent, the standard of culpability required under Kentucky
Law. It is possible that becausH6WLQVRQ·VFKDUJHZDVWHUPHG
´5HFNOHVV +RPLFLGHµ WKH MXU\ UHTXLUHG VRPH OHYHO RI
consciously reckless action on the part of Stinson, rather than
the grossly negligent action that is actually the basis of
Kentucky Reckless Homicide Law. In effect, by mislabeling
the law, the Kentucky Legislature may be confusing juries by
WHUPLQJ D FULPH ´5HFNOHVV +RPLFLGHµ ZKHQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI
recklessness found in section 501.020(4) of the Kentucky
5HYLVHG 6WDWXWHV UHTXLUHV RQO\ ´a failure to perceive a
substantial and unjustified risk and a gross deviation from
care from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in a similar situationµ150
As illuminating as the Stinson case might have been as an
DSSOLFDWLRQ LQ IRUP LI QRW LQ QDPH RI WKH 03&·V 1HJOigent
Homicide standard, the incorrect terminology used by the
145. Id. (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 407 (1958)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 cmt. 3.
149. Riley, supra note 1.
150. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.020(4) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
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.HQWXFN\ OHJLVODWXUH DORQJ ZLWK WKH MXURU·V DIRUHPHQWLRQHG
statements, demonstrate that the Stinson case may not be a
proper template upon which to gauge the willingness or
unwillingness of juries to utilize the criminal justice system in
instances of heat-related deaths. Therefore, the Stinson
acquittal should not be seen as the final word on the
acceptance or rejection of a negligent homicide charge in heat-
related deaths. In fact, the Stinson case is likely only the
beginning of such prosecutions.
In order to convict a coach for the negligent homicide of
one of his players in an instance of heat-related death, a
prosecutor must allege that the coach acted with gross
negligence³evidenced by unreasonably failing to perceive a
substantial and unjustifiable risk to his players.151 If a coach
knew that a player was taking a certain medication, such as
Max Gilpin taking Adderall,152 a jury may find that the
FRDFK·V IDLOXUH WR SHUFHLYH WKH ULVN RI RYHrexertion in ninety-
plus degree heat was a gross deviation from a reasonable
standard of care. In the Stinson case, however, the State did
not allege that Stinson knew Gilpin used Adderall.153
B. Model Penal Code Section 230.4 ³ Endangering the
Welfare of Children
7KH03&VWDWHVWKDWD´SDUHQWJXDUGLDQRURWKHUSHUVRQ
supervising the welfare of a child under [eighteen] commits a
misdemeanor LIKHNQRZLQJO\HQGDQJHUVWKHFKLOG·VZHOIDUHE\
YLRODWLQJDGXW\RIFDUHSURWHFWLRQRUVXSSRUWµ154 Elaborating
furthHU VHFWLRQ  ´LV GHVLJQHG WR UHSODFH YDJXH DQG
uncertain laws dealing with contributing to the delinquency
of a minor, child neglect, and corrupting the morals of a

151. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4.
152. Riley, supra note 1 ´>$@Q DPSKHWDPLQH XVHG WR WUHDW DWWHQWLRQ-deficit
K\SHUDFWLYLW\GLVRUGHUµ 
153. An issue that needs additional exploration is whether jurors in similar cases,
due to the societal value that Americans ascribe to athletics in general, may or may not
be willing to utilize a charge as serious as negligent homicide in order to punish
coaches. This is an unresolved question that will require further case law, prosecution,
and academic research to develop. Because of the possible institutional, societal, and
judicial bias in favor of sports, a prosecutor seeking to utilize the criminal justice
system may want to explore some of the following lesser charges.
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (1962) (emphasis added).
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PLQRUµ155 The drafters of the MPC specifically wanted to
forgo such amorphous language found in the common law
EHFDXVH´WKHEDVLFHUURULQVXFKOHJLVODWLRQLVWKHDVVXPSWLRQ
that the vague and comprehensive terms used . . . [are]
DSSURSULDWHIRUWKHGHILQLWLRQRIDFULPLQDORIIHQVHµ156 Rather,
WKH 03& ´OLPLWV WKH UHDFK RI WKH FULPLQDO ODZ Wo situations
where a parent, guardian, or other person supervising the
welfare of a child under eighteen knowingly endangers the
FKLOG·V ZHOIDUH E\ YLRODWLQJ D GXW\ RI FDUH SURWHFWLRQ RU
VXSSRUWµ157
The physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child are
DOO SURWHFWHG E\ WKH VHFWLRQ·V EURDG ODQJXDJH158 The duty
YLRODWHGE\WKHDGXOW´QHHGQRWEHVWDWHGLQWKHSHQDOFRGHEXW
may arise from contractual obligation, from settled principles
RI WRUW RU IDPLO\ ODZ RU IURP RWKHU OHJDO VRXUFHVµ159 A
´WHPSRUDU\Rr insignificant default is not criminal, although it
PD\ JLYH ULVH WR FLYLO OLDELOLW\µ160 Rather, the commentary
QRWHVWKDWWKHVHFWLRQVHHNVWRSXQLVKRQO\´consequential acts
violative of some settled obligation springing from the
supervisory relationshiS RI DFWRU WR FKLOGµ161 The element of
PHQV UHD ´H[SOLFLWO\ UHTXLUHV WKDW WKH DFWRU EH DZDUH RI WKH
IDFW WKDW KLV FRQGXFW HQGDQJHUV WKH ZHOIDUH RI WKH FKLOGµ162
KRZHYHU ´LW GRHV QRW PHDQ WKDW KH PXVW EH DZDUH WKDW WKH
law imposed the legal duty or that he must himself draw the
FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW KH LV YLRODWLQJ D OHJDO GXW\µ163 As such, the
section imposes culpability in instances where the adult has
caused actual and significant physical, mental, or moral
injury to a child, in breach of a duty arising from his
supervisory relationship to the child. Further, the adult need
not be aware of the legal consequences, rather he need only be
aware that his conduct endangers the child.
It should be noted that a duty between a coach and a
155. Id. explanatory note of section.
156. Id. cmt. 1.
157. Id. explanatory note of section.
158. Id. FPW  ´7KH WHQWDWLYH GUDIW UHIHUUHG WR ¶SK\VLFDO RU PRUDO· ZHOIDUH EXW D
VXEVHTXHQW VXJJHVWLRQ WR DGG ¶PHQWDO· WR WKH GHVFULSWLRQ SURPSWHG GHOHWLRQ RI DOO
TXDOLI\LQJDGMHFWLYHVDVDQHFRQRPLFDOZD\WRDFKLHYHFRPSUHKHQVLYHFRYHUDJHµ 
159. Id.
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 3.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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player clearly exists, as it is the basis of civil liability. Section
230.4, depending on the factual circumstances of a situation,
may act as a successful mechanism for the imposition of
criminal liability, albeit only a misdemeanor, on a coach. Two
caveats apply, however. First, no state has expressly adopted
MPC section 230.4, although many have followed its
underlying principles.164 )RU H[DPSOH 1HZ -HUVH\·V FKLOG
HQGDQJHUPHQWVWDWXWHVWDWHVWKDW´DQ\SHUVRQKDYLQJDOHJDO
duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility
IRUWKHFDUHRIDFKLOGµLVJXLOW\RIVHFRQGGHJUHHIHORQ\LIWKDW
SHUVRQ ´FDXVHV WKH FKLOG KDUP WKDW ZRXOG PDNH WKH FKLOG DQ
DEXVHG RU QHJOHFWHG FKLOGµ165 New Jersey defines an abused
RU QHJOHFWHG FKLOG DV RQH ZKR KDV VXIIHUHG D  ´XQQHFHVVDU\
suffHULQJ RU SDLQ HLWKHU PHQWDO RU SK\VLFDOµ RU E  ´DQ\
willful act of omission or commission whereby unnecessary
pain and suffering, whether mental or physical, [was] caused
RU SHUPLWWHG WR EH LQIOLFWHG RQ >WKH@ FKLOGµ RU F  H[SRVXUH WR
´XQQHFHVVDU\ KDUGship, fatigue or mental or physical strains
that [injured] the health or physical or moral well-being of
VXFK FKLOGµ166 Therefore, applicability will depend heavily
upon the statute as written in a given jurisdiction, as well as
its accompanying interpretive case law. Second, the higher
mens rea requirement, requiring something akin to
recklessness³DZDUHQHVV WKDW RQH·V ´FRQGXFW HQGDQJHUV WKH
ZHOIDUH RI WKH FKLOGµ167³creates another more significant
hurdle. Regardless, this lesser charge, in a case where the
coach may have been recklessly aware of a risk of injury, may
be seen by a reluctant jury as a more appropriate charge and
penalty due to an underlying bias in favor of protecting
coaches, which precludes them from finding a coach guilty of a
more serious charge, such as negligent homicide.
C. Model Penal Code Section 211.2 ³ Recklessly
Endangering Another Person
A prosecutor may also use MPC section 211.2 to confer
criminal liability on a coach even if the player does not die. 168
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (2010).
Id. § 9:6-1.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 3.
See generally id. § 211.2.
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The prosecutor will, however, need to prove recklessness,
EHFDXVH´>Q@HJOLJHQWO\SODFLQJDQRWKHULQGDQJHURIGHDWKLVD
felony of the third degree if death results, but no crime at all if
LW GRHV QRWµ169 On the other hand, this section applies
´ZLWKRXWUHJDUGWRZKHWKHU . . . harm aFWXDOO\RFFXUVµ170
6HFWLRQ  VWDWHV WKDW D ´SHUVRQ FRPPLWV D
misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places
or may place another person in danger of death or serious
ERGLO\ LQMXU\µ171 Unlike section 230.4³Endangering the
Welfare of a Child³this section expressly requires
recklessness on the part of the defendant.172 The MPC
VWUHVVHV WKDW UHFNOHVVQHVV UHYROYHV DURXQG D ´conscious
disregard >RI@ D VXEVWDQWLDO DQG XQMXVWLILDEOH ULVNµ173 as
compared to criminal negligence, which stresses ´a failure to
perceive DVXEVWDQWLDODQGXQMXVWLILHGULVNµ174 This is a high
threshold to meet and it is unlikely that a prosecutor will
commonly encounter facts to support a successful charge. A
defense attorney would likely be able to³in all but the most
egregious instances of callous activity by a coach³raise a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was acting with
WKH UHTXLVLWH ´FRQVFLRXV GLVUHJDUGµ HVSHFLDOO\ FRPSDUHG WR
facially reckless common law activities the section was
intended to replace.175 Although prosecutors may find it
difficult to obtain a FRQYLFWLRQ XQGHU WKH 03&·V 5HFNOHVV
Endangerment section, they should still explore it in the
appropriate circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Heat-related deaths sustained by high school student-
athletes are on the rise because the civil liability system is not
fully performing its deterrent function. Certain aspects of the
civil liability system, such as qualified and sovereign
LPPXQLW\ KDPSHU SODLQWLIIV· DELOLW\ WR UHFRYHU GDPDJHV
169. Id. cmt. 2 (referring to negligent homicide MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4)
(emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 211.2.
172. Id.
173. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).
174. § 2.02(2)(d).
175. § 211.2 cmt. 1 n.13.
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significant enough to change the behavior of coaches and
schools. The filing of criminal charges related to the death of
Max Gilpin spurred action by schools, legislatures, and
coaches to a degree that previous deaths and ensuing civil
litigation were unable.176 The threat of criminal prosecution,
even in the absence of a conviction, has shown an ability to
precipitate the adoption of coaching and school behavior
which will reduce the risk of further deaths. Due to this
effect, criminal prosecutions should not be abandoned
prematurely, regardless of the lack of a conviction in the
Stinson trial. If further unsuccessful prosecutions begin to
show that juries are unwilling to utilize the criminal justice
system in order to penalize coaches for their dangerous
behavior, legislatures may need to reexamine the doctrines of
qualified and sovereign immunity in order to bolster the
deterrent effect of the civil liability system.

176. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

